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To the Congress of the United States. 



H fIDemodal 

IN BEHALF OF THE ARCHITECT OF OUR 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 

Pelatiah Webster 

of Philadelphia, Penn. 



HEREIN IS REPRINTED, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ll6 YEARS, THE 
EPOCH-MAKING PAPER PUBUSHED BY PELATIAH WEBSTER AT 
PHILADELPHIA, FEBRUARY i6TH, 1 783, AND THERE REPUBLISHED 
WITH NOTES IN 1791, IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED TO THE WORLD, 
as his invention, THE ENTIRE PLAN OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES, WORKED OUT IN DETAIL MORE THAN FOUR 
YEARS BEFORE THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 787 MET. 

Humbly presented by 

HANNIS TAYI.OR. 



£3o 



Wz T? 



To the Congress of the United States: 

The purpose of this memorial is twofold: first, to place 
in the hands of Congress the data for a new and pivotal 
chapter in the history of the Constitution that will impress 
upon succeeding generations the all-important fact that 
every basic principle which differentiates our existing 
federal system from all that have preceded it was a part 
of a single invention struck off at a given time by the brain 
and purpose of one man; second, to press upon Congress 
the long neglected duty of honoring, by an appropriate 
monument, the memory of an American statesman and 
patriot who has made a larger personal contribution to the 
science of government than any other one individual in the 
history of mankind. From the data thus presented it 
clearly appears that among our nation-builders Pelatiah 
Webster stands second to Washington alone. All the 
world understands in a vague and general way that certain 
path-breaking principles entered into the structure of our 
second federal constitution of 1789 which differentiate it 
from all other system.s of federal government that have 
preceded it. M. de Tocqueville gave formal expression 
to that understanding when he said: "This Constitution, 
which may at first be confounded with federal constitutions 
that have preceded it, rests in truth upon a wholly novel 
theory which may be considered a great discovery in modern 
political science. In the confederations that preceded the 
American Constitution of 1789, the allied states, for a 
common object, agreed to obey the injunctions of a federal 
government; but they reserved to themselves the right of 
ordaining and enforcing the execution of the laws of the 
Union. The American States, which combined in 1789, 



agreed that the federal government should not only dictate, 
but should execute its own enactments. In both cases 
the right is the same, but the exercise of the right is different ; 
and this difference produced the most momentous conse- 
quences."* Mr. Gladstone simply reiterated that idea when 
he said: "As the British Constitution is the most subtile 
organism which has proceeded from progressive histor}^, 
so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work 
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose 
of man. " That master of the history of English institutions 
perfectly understood that as our state constitutions are 
mere reproductions, mere evolutions from the English 
political system, so our second federal constitution is a 
new invention " struck off at a given time by the brain and 
purpose of man." 

That invention of a new type of federal government, 
embodying, as Tocqueville said, "a wholly novel theory," 
is so unique that it can no more be confounded with any 
preceding federal government than a modern mogul engine 
can be confounded with an ancient stage coach. Did that 
wonderful invention, which has produced such momentous 
consequences, have a personal author, like all other inven- 
tions; or was it revealed at the same moment, and in some 
mysterious way, to a large number of persons, thinking and 
acting in isolation? Upon that humanly impossible or 
miraculous theory historians of our existing constitution 
have attempted to explain the origin of the unique and 
pre-arranged plan of federal government presented to the 
Convention which sat at Philadelphia during the 125 days 
that intervened between May 14 and September 17, 1787. 
After deducting recesses and holidays there could not have 
been more than 90 working days. No one has ever con- 

* Democracy in America, vol. i, pp. 198,199. 



tended, or can ever contend, that the great invention in 
question was made after the Convention met, for the simple 
and conclusive reason that it was the basis of all the " plans ' ' 
save one, carefully constructed beforehand, out of which 
the Constitution was evolved. Five and only five "plans," 
all pre-arranged, were submitted to the Convention, viz., 
the Virginia plan, the Charles Pinckney plan, the Connecticut 
plan, the Alexander Hamilton plan, and the New Jersey 
plan. As the last only proposed a revision of the Articles 
of Confederation it may be dismissed from consideration. 
There were but four plans in which proposals for a new 
system of federal government were embodied, each resting 
upon the "wholly novel theory" which has produced "the 
most momentous consequences." 

A distinguished specialist has well said that "the Virginia 
plan became the bed-rock of the Constitution.* That plan, 
which embodied perfectly every phase of the great invention, 
was drafted by Madison, who began his preparation for the 
labors of the Convention at least a year before it met.f 
In December, 1786, we find him in active correspondence 
with Jefferson, then at Paris, as to the Virginia plan. J 
The marvel is that the historians who are supposed to have 
explored the sources have never taken the pains to ask this 
simple and inevitable question — From what common source 
did the draftsmen of the four plans draw the path-breaking 
invention which was the foundation of all of them. Let it be 
said to the honor of those draftsmen that no one of them 
ever claimed to be the author of that invention. Neither 

* Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787, 
p. 17. 

fSee Rives' Life and Times of Madison, vol. ii, p. 208, "Preparations of 
Madison for labors of Federal Convention." 

JSee letter of Jefferson to Madison of December 16, 1786, in Jefferson's 
Correspondence, by T. J. Randolph, vol. ii, pp. 64, 65. 



Madison, nor Charles Pinckney, nor Sherman, nor Ellsworth, 
nor Hamilton, nor any of their biographers, so far as the 
writer is informed, ever set up such a claim in behalf of any 
one of them. The answer to "the simple and inevitable 
question" just propounded is this: The common source 
from which the draftsmen of the four plans drew the path- 
breaking invention underlying them all was "A Dissertation 
on the Political Union and Constitution of the thirteen 
United States of North America," published at Philadelphia 
by Pelatiah Webster, February i6, 1783, and there repub- 
lished by him with copious notes in 1791, and herein repro- 
duced for the first time after the lapse of 116 years. In 
that immortal paper, whose lightest words are weighty, 
he gave to the world, as his personal contribution to the 
science of government, and as an entirety worked out in great 
detail the "wholly novel theory" of federal government 
upon which reposes the existing Constitution of the United 
States. 

Prior to the date in question no single element of that 
theory had ever been propounded by anyone. In a note 
appended to the republication of 1791 the great inventor 
gives the following account of the circumstances under 
which the invention was made: "At the time when this 
Dissertation was written (February 16, 1783) the defects 
and insufficiency of the Old Federal Constitution were 
universally felt and acknowledged ; it was - manifest, not 
only that the internal police, justice, security, and peace 
of the States could never be preserved under it, but the 
finances and public credit would necessarily become so 
embarrassed, precarious, and void of support, that no public 
movement, which depended on the revenue, could be 
managed with any effectual certainty: but tho' the public 
mind was under full conviction of all these mischiefs, and 



was contemplating a remedy, yet the pubuc ideas WERE 

NOT AT AI.Iv CONCENTRATED, MUCH LESS ARRANGED^INTO 
ANY NEW SYSTEM OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT, which WOUld 

obviate these evils. Under these circumstances, I offered 
this Dissertation to the public: how far the principles of 
it were adopted or rejected in the New Constitution, which 
was four years afterwards (Sep. 17, 1787) formed by the 
General Convention, and since ratified by all the States, is 
obvious to every one." 

At the same time he added: "I was fully of opinion 
(tho' the sentiment at that time would not very well bear) 
that it would be ten times easier to form a new Constitution 
than to mend the old one. I therefore sat myself down to 
sketch out the leading principles of that political Constitu- 
tion, which I thought necessary to the preservation and 
happiness of the United States of America, which are com- 
prised in this Dissertation. I hope the reader will please 
to consider, that these are the original thoughts of a private 
individual, dictated by the nature of the subject only, long 
before the important theme became the great object of 
discussion, in the most dignified and important assembly 
which ever sat or decided in America." The great inventor 
perfectly understood the merits of his own case which he 
thus stated with the lucidity of a Greek and the terseness 
of a Roman. As early as 1781 Pelatiah Webster was the 
first to propose to the people of the United States, in one 
of his financial essays published at Philadelphia in May of 
that year, the calling of "a Continental Convention" for the 
making of a new Constitution.* In bearing testimony to 
that fact Madison said that Pelatiah Webster, "after dis- 

*The fact that "Alexander Hamilton made the same suggestion in a private 
letter to James Duane, September 3, 1780," is of no importance. It was not 
a public act, not even a public declaration. See Gaillard Hunt's "Life of 
James Madison," p. 108. 



cussing the fiscal system of the United States, and suggesting, 
among other remedial provisions, one including a national 
bank, remarks, that 'the authority of Congress is very 
inadequate to the performance of their duties; and this 
indicates the necessity of their calling a Continental Conven- 
tion for the express purpose of ascertaining, defining, enlarg- 
ing and limiting, the duties and powers of their Constitu- 
tion.'"* Two years after he had thus sounded the tocsin 
for the States to assemble, he made the invention and pub- 
lished to the world, in detail, the plan upon which the Con- 
stitution was to be formed. While the historian Bancroft! 
failed to appreciate the stupendous importance of his work, 
he frankly admits that he actually performed it when he says : 
"The public mind was ripening for a transition from a 
confederation to a real government. Just at this time 
Pelatiah Webster, a graduate of Yale College, in a disser- 
tation published at Philadelphia, proposed for the legis- 
lature of the United States a congress of two houses which 
should have ample authority for making laws 'of general 
necessity and utility,' and enforcing them as well on indi- 
viduals as on States. He further suggested not only heads 
of executive departments, but judges of law and chancery. 
The tract awakened so much attention that it was reprinted 
in Hartford, and called forth a reply. "{ In both of the 
scanty and stingy biographical notices of him in the leading 
American Encyclopaedias, the statement is made that 
his plan "is mentioned by James Madison as having an 
influence in directing the public mind to the necessity of a 
better form of government." Pelatiah Webster needs the 
admissions neither of Madison nor Bancroft to establish 

♦The Madison Papers (1841), vol. ii, pp. 706-7. 

t History of the Constitution of the United States, vol. i, p. 86. 

Jit was replied to anonymously by Roger Sherman. 



his title to the authorship of the "wholly novel theory" 
now embodied in the Constitution of the United States, 
because that title rests upon contemporary documentary 
evidence as clear and convincing as that upon which rests 
Jefferson's title to the authorship of the Declaration of 
Independence. If that be true, then he has made a larger 
personal contribution to the science of government than 
any other one individual in the history of mankind. Among 
our nation-builders he stands second to Washington alone. 
And yet among them all he only has been neglected and 
forgotten by his countrymen, not through any conscious 
omission, but because of a careless historical scholarship 
which has failed to present his great achievement in its 
true light. That conviction has impelled the undersigned — 
who has devoted more than thirty years to the special 
study of the origin and growth of our constitutional systems, 
state and federal — to present to the Congress herein, very 
briefly, the historical data upon which Pelatiah Webster's 
right to immortality depends. He it was who first suggested 
the separate existence of the two houses of Congress, when, 
in 1783, he said "That the Congress shall consist of two 
chambers, an upper and lower house, or senate and commons, 
with the concurrence of both necessary to every act; and that 
every State send one or more delegates to each house: 
this will subject every act to two discussions before two 
distinct chambers of men equally qualified for the debate, 
equally masters of the subject, and of equal authority in the 
decision."* Prior to that utterance no federal assembly, 
ancient or modern, had ever consisted of two chambers; 
no one had ever suggested such an idea. If after a careful 
examination of all the facts the Congress shall deem the 
architect of our federal constitution unworthy of a monu- 

* The italics in all the quotations from Pelatiah Webster's paper are his own. 



8 



ment, the undersigned prays in his behalf that this humble 
memorial may be embodied in its records so that succeeding 
generations may determine for themselves whether or no 
his work has been justly judged. 



I. 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO AND INCLUDING THAT 

OF 1776. 

From the days of the Greek Leagues dowTi to the making 
of the second constitution of the United States, all federal 
governments had been constructed on a single plan at once 
clumsy and inefficient. The most perfect of the Greek 
Leagues was the Achaian,of which the framers really knew 
nothing, as we learn from Madison who tells us in the Feder- 
alists (xviii) that "could the interior structure and regular 
operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is 
probable that more light might be thrown by it on the 
science of federal government than by any like experiments 
with which we are acquainted." The coveted knowledge 
was not accessible because the historical scholars who have 
since passed beyond the Greece of Thucydides into the 
Greece of Polybios, who have passed beyond the period in 
which the independent city-commonwealth was the domi- 
nant political idea into the later and less brilliant period 
of Hellenic freedom occupied by the history of Greek feder- 
alism, had not then completed their investigations, only 
fully worked out in very recent years.* Such scanty 
knowledge as the framers did possess of Greek federalism 
seems to have been chiefly drawn from the little work of the 
Abbe Mably, Observations sur VHistoire de Grece (Federalist, 

♦The first volume (History of Greek Federations) of Edward A. Freeman's 
great History of Federal Government was not published until 1863. 



xviii). The only federal governments with whose internal 
organizations the builders of our federal republic were really 
familiar, and whose histories had any practical effect upon 
their work, were those that had grown up between the 
Low-Dutch communities at the mouth of the Rhine, and 
between the High-Dutch communities in the mountains 
of Switzerland, and upon the plains of Germany (Federalist, 
xix, xx). Down to the making of the second constitution 
of the United States, the Confederation of Swiss Cantons, 
the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and the German 
Confederation really represented the total advance made 
by the modern world in the structure of federal governments. 
Such advance was embodied in the idea of a federal system 
made up of a union of states, cities or districts, representa- 
tives from which composed a single federal assembly whose 
limited powers could be brought to bear, not upon individual 
citizens, but only upon cities or states as such. The funda- 
mental principle upon which all such fabrics rested was the 
requisition system, under which the federal assembly was 
only endowed with the power to make requisitions for men 
and money upon the states or cities composing the league 
for federal purposes, while the states, alone, in their corporate 
capacity possessed the power to execute them. The initial 
effort of the English colonies in America along the path 
of federal union ended with the making of the first consti- 
tution of the United States embodied in the Articles of 
Confederation. Up to that point nothing new had been 
achieved ; the fruit of the first effort was simply a confedera- 
tion, constructed upon a plan over two thousand years old, 
which could only deal through the requisition system with 
states as states. That confederation possessed no power 
(i) to operate directly upon the individual citizen; (2) it 
had no independent power of taxation; (3) the federal 



lO 

head was not divided into three departments, executive, 
legislative and judicial; (4) the federal assembly consisted 
of one chamber instead of two.* The lack of power to levy 
and collect for itself federal or national taxes rendered our 
first federal government preeminently a failure as a finan- 
cial system, dependent as it was upon the will of thirteen 
independent legislatures. 

II. 

PELATIAH WEBSTER'S INVENTION AND THE SECOND 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787. 

The most scientific writer upon finance during the Revo- 
lutionary War was Pelatiah Webster, whose essays on that 
subject fill a volume, t He was bom at Lebanon, Connecticut, 
in 1725, and graduated at Yale College in 1746. In 1755 
he removed to Philadelphia, where he became a prosperous 
merchant, and in due time an ardent supporter of the 
patriot cause in the War of the Revolution, aiding with 
pen and purse. He was captured by the British, and, on 
account of his ardor was imprisoned for four months. As 
early as October, 1776, he began to write on the currency 
and in 1779 he commenced the publication at Philadelphia 
of a series of " Essays on Free Trade and Finance. " He was 
sufficiently important as a political economist to be con- 
sulted by the Continental Congress as to the resources of 
the country. His financial studies soon convinced him that 
no stable fiscal system could be established until the then 
existing federal government was wiped out and superseded 
by one endowed with independent taxing power. There- 

*See Pelatiah Webster's masterful analysis of the first Constitution con- 
tained in his Notes published in 1791, infra, p. 48. 

fThe second edition of 1791 was "Printed and sold by Joseph Crukshank, 
No. 91, High Street," Philadelphia. 



II 



fore, as early as 1781, in one of his financial essays, he made 
the first public call for the "Continental Convention," 
referred to by Madison, to be armed with power to devise 
an adequate system of federal government. Having thus 
taken the first step, he set himself to work to formulate in 
advance such an adequate system as the Convention should 
adopt, whenever it might meet. In the great tract pub- 
lished at Philadelphia, February 16, 1783, we have photo- 
graphed for us the workings of his mind as he moved along 
paths never trod before. He sounded the key-note when 
he declared: "They (the supreme power) must therefore 
of necessity be vested with a power of taxation. I know this 
is a most important and weighty truth, a dreadful engine 
of oppression, tyranny, and injury, when ill used; yet, from 
the necessity of the case, it must be admitted. 

For to give a supreme authority a power of making 
contracts, without any power of payment — of appointing 
officers, civil and military without money to pay them; 
power to build ships, without any money to do it with; 
a power of emitting money, without any power to redeem 
it; or of borrowing money without any power to make 
payment etc. — such solecisms in government are so nuga- 
tory and absurd, that I really think to offer further argument 
on the subject would be to insult the understanding of my 
readers. To make all these payments dependent on the 
votes of thirteen popular assemblies, who will undertake to 
judge of the propriety of every contract and every occasion 
of money, and grant or withhold supplies according to their 
opinion, whilst at the same time the operations of the whole 
may be stopped by the vote of a single one of them, is 
absurd." Thus Pelatiah Webster proposed the existing 
system of federal taxation, then entirely new, to the world ; 
thus he proposed that the ancient system of requisitions, 



12 

resting on the taxing power of the states, should be super- 
seded by a system of federal or national taxation extending 
to every citizen, directly or indirectly. Instead of the 
lifeless system of absurdity embodied in the Articles of 
Confederation, he proposed to substitute a self -executing 
and self-sustaining national system, based on the following 
propositions, stated in his owti language: "The supreme 
authority of any State must have power enough to affect the 
ends of its appointment, otherwise these ends cannot be 
answered and effectually secured . . . 1 begin with my first 
and great principle, viz.. Thai the Constitution must vest 
powers in every department sufficient to secure and make 
effectual the ends of it. The supreme authority must have 
the power of makiyig war and peace — of appointing armies 
and navies — of appointing officers both civil and military — 
of making contracts — of emitting, coining, and borrowing 
money — of regulating trade — of making treaties with foreign 
powers — of establishing post-offices — and, in short, of doing 
everything which the well-being of the Commonwealth may 
require, and which is not compatible to any particular State, 
all of which require money, and cannot possibly be made 
effectual without it . . . This tax can be laid by the 
supreme authority much more conveniently than by the 
particular Assemblies, and would in no case be subject to 
their repeals or modifications; and of course the public 
credit would never be dependent on, or liable to bankruptcy 
by the humors of any particular assembly . . . The dele- 
gates which are to form that august body, which are to 
hold and exercise the supreme authority, ought to be 
appointed by the States in any manner they please.'' In for- 
mulating his conclusions as to the supremacy of federal 
law acting directly on all citizens, he said: "(i) No laws of 
any State whatever, which do not carry in them a force which 



13 

extends to their effectual and final execution, can afford a 
certain or sufficient security to the subject — this is too plain 
to need proof; (2) Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially 
of august bodies of high dignity and consequence) , which fail 
of execution, are much worse than none ; they weaken the gov- 
ernment; expose it to contempt ... A government which 
is but half executed, or whose operations may all be stopped 
by a single vote, is the most dangerous of all institutions . . . 
Further I propose that if the execution of any act or order 
of the supreme authority shall be opposed by force in any of 
the States (which God forbid !) it shall be lawful for Congress 
to send into such State a sufficient force to suppress it. 
On the whole, I take it that the very existence and use of 
our union effectually depends on the full energy and final 
effect of the laws made to support it; and therefore I sacri- 
fice all other considerations to this energy and effect, and if our 
Union is not worth this purchase we must give it up — the 
nature of the thing does not admit any other alternative." 
In these ringing terms was announced the path-breaking 
invention of a supreme and self -executing federal govern- 
rnent operating directly upon the citizen; an invention for 
which the world had been waiting for two thousand years; 
an invention of which no trace or hint is to be found in the 
Constitutions of any of the Teutonic Leagues, in the Articles 
of Confederation, or in the prior utterance of any other man. 

Having thus defined his fundamental concept of a federal 
government operating directly on the citizen, the great one 
boldly accepted the inevitable corollary that such a govern- 
ment must be strictly organized and equipped with miachin- 
ery adequate to its ends — with the usual branches, executive, 
legislative, and judicial; with its army, its navy, its civil 
service, and all the usual apparatus of a government, all 
bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union without 



14 

any reference to the government of the several States. 
No such federal government, ancient or modern, had ever 
existed. As Montesquieu was the first to point out, the 
division of state powers into executive, legislative and 
judicial, originated in that single State in Britain we call 
England.* From that single State the principle passed 
into the single States of the American Union. f Pelatiah 
Webster was the first to conceive of the application of the 
principle of the division of powers to a federal state; he was 
the first to propose that the federal head should be divided 
and then organized as the particular ones are into legis- 
lative, executive, and judicial. More than three years later 
Jefferson endorsed that idea by commending it to Madison. | 
Having thus made his second great invention, Webster 
proceeded to explain how the three departments, executive, 
legislative, and judicial, should be organized. His idea was 
that the executive power should be vested in a council of 
ministers to be grouped around a President elected by 
Congress. On that subject he said: "These ministers will 
of course have the best information, and most perfect 
knowledge, of the state of the Nation, as far as it relates to 
their several departments, and will of course be able to give 
the best information to Congress, in what manner any bill 
proposed will affect the public interest in their several 
departments, which will nearly comprehend the whole. 
The Financier manages the whole subject of the revenues 
and expenditures; the Secretary of State takes knowledge 
of the general policy and internal government ; the Minister 
of War presides in the whole business of war and defence; 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs regards the whole state 

*Spirit of Laws, bk. xi, ch. 6. 

f Federalist, xlvi. 

Jin the letter written from Paris, December 1 6, 17S6, heretofore cited. 



15 

of the nation, as it stands related to, or connected with, 
all foreign powers ... I would further propose, that the 
aforesaid great ministers of state shall compose a Council of 
State, to whose number Congress may add three others, viz,, 
one from New England, one from the Middle States and one 
from the Southern States, one of which to be appointed 
President by Congress.'' To the organization of the legis- 
lative department Webster gave elaborate consideration. 
Just as no prior federal government had ever been divided 
into three departments, so no prior federal legislature 
had ever been divided into two houses. The one-chamber 
body represented by the Continental Congress was the type 
of every other federal assembly that had ever preceded it. 
As stated heretofore the path-breaker, looking to the English 
bicameral system as it had appeared in the several States, 
proposed "That the Congress shall consist of two chambers, 
an upper and lower house, or senate and commons, with the 
concurrence of both necessary to every act; and that every 
State send one or more delegates to each house: this will 
subject every act to two discussions before two distinct 
chambers of m.en equally qualified for the debate, equally 
masters of the subject, and of equal authority in the decision." 
Citizens of the United States, to whom such a division now 
seems a matter of course, should remember that when 
Webster proposed it, it was an unprecedented novelty in the 
history of the world, so far as federal legislatures are con- 
cerned. After an elaborate discussion of the qualifications 
of members of Congress, in which he sharply assailed the 
then existing rule forbidding their reelection, he proceeded 
to define a part of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States by saying "that the supreme 
authority should be vested with powers to termifiate and 
finally decide controversies arising between different States." 



i6 

He also said "To these I would add Judges of law and 
chancery." Thus the entire federal judicial system was 
distinctly outlined. Above all he was careful to define the 
reserved powers of the States. On that subject he said: 
" I propose further, that the powers of Congress, and all 
the other departments acting under them, shall all be 
restricted to such matters only of general necessity and utility 
to all the States, as cannot come within the jurisdiction 
of any particular State , or to which the authority of any 
particular State is not competent: so that each particular 
State shall enjoy all sovereignty and supreme authority 
to all intents and purposes, excepting only those high 
authorities and powers by them delegated to Congress, 
for the purposes of the general union." In that passage 
we have the first draft, and a very complete one, of the 
Tenth Amendment.* So it is a matter of documentary 
evidence that every element that entered into the "wholly 
novel theory, which may be considered a great discovery 
in modern political science," and which differentiates our 
second federal constitution of 1789 from every other that 
preceded it, was the deliberate invention of Pelatiah Webster, 
who announced to the world that theory, as an entirety, 
in his epoch-making paper of February 16, 1783. Prior 
to that date no federal government had ever existed (i) that 
operated directly on the individual citizen; (2) no federal 
government had ever been divided into three departments, 
executive, legislative and judicial; (3) no federal legislature 
had ever been divided into an upper and lower house. 
There is no record, there is not even a claim that, prior 
to that date, any human being had ever propounded anyone 

♦It provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively or to the people." 



17 

of those principles in connection with a federal government. 
The great inventor was so conscious at the time of the 
magnitude of his undertaking that he exclaimed as he wrote : 
"May Almighty wisdom direct my pen in this arduous discus- 
sion." In conclusion he said "This vast subject lies with 
mighty weight on my mind, and I have bestowed on it my 
utmost attention, and here offer the public the best thoughts 
and sentiments I am master of . . , I have not the vanity 
to imagine that my sentiments may be adopted ; I shall have 
all the reward I wish or expect, if my Dissertation shall throw 
any light on the great subject, shall excite an emulation 
of inquiry, and animate some abler genius to form a plan of 
greater perfection, less objectionable, and more useful." 
In his republication of 1791 he described perfectly the 
circumstances under which the great invention of February 
16, 1783, was made, when he said that, "the public ideas 
were not at all concentrated, much less arranged into any 
new system or form of government, which would obviate 
these evils. Under these circumstances I offered this Dis- 
sertation to the public." In that Dissertation, Pelatiah 
Webster presented, as a free gift to the great country that 
has neglected and forgotten him, the "new system or form 
of government" which passed, through the jour ''plans''^ 
offered in the Federal Convention of 1787, into the existing 
Constitution of the United States. Certainly no more 
"wonderful work was ever struck off at a given time by the 

*At a later time a grave controversy arose as to "the singularly minute 
coincidences between the draft of a Federal government communicated by 
Mr. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, to Mr. Adams, Secretary of State," 
the Virginia plan, and the Constitution as finally adopted. Every explana- 
tion was given of "the singularly minute coincides," except the plain and 
obvious one — the jour plans out of which the Constitution arose were taken from 
a common source. For a statement of the controversy in question see Rives' 
Life and Times of Madison, vol. ii, pp. 353-357- 



i8 

brain and purpose of man." The outcome of that work 
was a novel and unique creation operating directly on the 
people, and not upon the States as corporations. The 
State governments are not subject to the central government. 
The people are subject to both governments. The new 
creation is in no respect federal in its operation, although 
it is in some respects federal in its organization. No one 
of the three basic principles constituting the great invention 
was seriously questioned in the Convention. Its mighty 
and immortal task involved only their adaptation to very 
difificult and complex political conditions. The inventor 
of the plan stands to the members of the Convention as an 
architect stands to master builders. 

As an evidence of the highly practical temper of Pelatiah 
Webster the fact should be mentioned in conclusion that, 
having been a successful merchant, his pet hobby seems to 
have been to create a Department of Commerce in close 
touch with Congress . He said : " I therefore humbly propose , 
if the merchants in the several States are disposed to send 
delegates from their body, to meet and attend the sitting 
of Congress, that they shall be permitted to form a chamber 
of commerce, and their advice to Congress be demanded and 
admitted concerning all bills before Congress, as far as the 
same may affect the trade of the States/' In his criticisms 
made in 1791 of the work of the Federal Convention he said 
that its failure to accept that suggestion was a great mistake. 
The very recent creation of a Department of Commerce 
and Labor has at last effectuated his idea. Only through 
the vista of receding years can such an epoch-making mind 
be viewed in all its grandeur. What signifies a century of 
neglect passed in the midst of the "momentous conse- 
quences" his mighty work has wrought! His time is at 
hand; his fame is as safe and as certain as the immortality 



19 

of thought and the unerring justice of the tribunal of history. 
His abiding faith in the justice of that tribunal he clearly- 
expressed when he said: "But if any of these questions 
should in future time become objects of discussion, neither 
the vast dignity of the Convention, nor the low unnoticed 
state of myself, will be at all considered in the debates; 
the merits of the matter, and the interests connected with or 
arising out of it will alone dictate the decision." The 
humanly impossible and miraculous theory which has 
heretofore serenely assumed that the greatest and most 
unique of all political inventions had no inventor, cannot 
survive a method of historical investigations that under- 
takes to demonstrate that beneath every shell there is an 
animal, behind every document there is a man. The emi- 
nent French critic and historian Ch. V. Langlais has said: 
"History is studied from documents. Documents are the 
traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions 
of men of former times. There is no substitute for docu- 
ments: no documents, no history." Strange indeed it is 
that the most important document connected with our 
Constitutional history should now be presented to the 
jurists and statesmen of the United States as if it were a 
papyrus from Egypt or Herculaneum. 



III. 

THE EPOCH=MAKINQ DOCUMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1783, 
IN WHICH IS EMBODIED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE 
EXISTING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 

A 

DISSERTATION 

O N T H E 

POLITICAL UNION 

AND 

CONSTITUTION 

O F T H E 

THIRTEEN UNITED STATES 

O F 

NOR T H A M E R I C A, 

which is necessary to their Preservatiott and Happiness ; 
humbly offered to the Public. 

(First published in Philadelphia, 1783.) 

I. The supreme authority of any State must have power 
enough to effect the ends of its appointment, otherwise 
these ends cannot be answered, and effectually secured; 
at best they are precarious. — But at the same time, 

II. The supreme authority ought to be so limited and 
checked, if possible, as to prevent the abuse of power, or 
the exercise of powers that are not necessary to the ends 
of its appointment, but hurtful and oppressive to the sub- 
ject; but to limit a supreme authority so far as to diminish 
its dignity, or lessen its power of doing good, would be to 
destroy or at least to corrupt it, and render it ineffectual 
to its ends. 



21 

III. A number of sovereign States uniting into one 
Commonwealth, and appointing a supreme power to manage 
the affairs of the Union, do necessarily and unavoidably 
part with and transfer over to such supreme power, so 
much of their own sovereignty as is necessary to render 
the ends of the union effectual, otherwise their confedera- 
tion will be an union without bands of union, like a cask 
without hoops, that may and probably will fall to pieces, 
as soon as it is put to any exercise which requires strength. 

In like manner, every m.ember of civil society parts 
with many of his natural rights, that he may enjoy the rest 
in greater security under the protection of society. 

The Union of the Thirteen States of America is of mighty 
consequence to the security, sovereignty, and even liberty of 
each of them, and of all the individuals who compose them; 
united under a natural, well adjusted, and effectual Consti- 
tution, they are a strong, rich, growing power, with great 
resources and means of defence, which no foreign power 
will easily attempt to invade or insult; they may easily 
command respect. 

As their exports are mostly either raw materials or 
provisions, and their imports mostly finished goods, their 
trade becomes a capital object with every manufacturing 
nation of Europe, and all the southern colonies of America; 
their friendship and trade will of course be courted, and 
each power in amity with them will contribute to their 
security. 

Their union is of great moment in another respect; they 
thereby form a superintending power among themselves, 
that can moderate and terminate disputes that may arise 
between different States, restrain intestine violence, and 
prevent any recourse to the dreadful decision of the sword. 

I do not mean here to go into a detail of all the advantages 
of our union ; they offer themselves on every view, and 
are important enough to engage every honest, prudent 
mind, to secure and establish that union by every possible 
method, that we may enjoy the full benefit of it, and be 
rendered happy and safe under the protection it affords. 

This union, however important, cannot be supported 
without a Constitution founded on principles of natural 
truth, fitness, and utility. If there is one article wrong 
in such Constitution, it will discover itself in practice, by 
its baleful operation, and destroy or at least injure the 
union. 

Many nations have been ruined by the errors of their 



22 

political constitutions. Such errors first introduce wrongs 
and injuries, which soon breed discontents, which grad- 
ually work up into mortal hatred and resentments; hence 
inveterate parties are formed, which of course make the 
whole community a house divided against itself, which 
soon falls either a prey to some enemies without, who 
watch to devour them, or else crumble into their original 
constituent parts, and lose all respectability, strength, 
and security. 

It is as physically impossible to secure to civil society, 
good cement of union, duration, and security, without a 
Constitution founded on principles of natural fitness and 
right, as to raise timbers into a strong, compact building, 
which have not been framed upon true geom.etric principles ; 
for if you cut one beam a foot too long or too short, not all 
the authority and all the force of all the carpenters can ever 
get it into its place, and make it fit with proper sym.metry 
there. 

As the fate then of all governments depends much upon 
their political constitutions, they become an object of 
mighty moment to the happiness and well-being of society; 
and as the framing of such a Constitution requires great 
knowledge of the rights of men and societies, as well as of 
the interests, circum^stances, and even prejudices of the 
several parts of the community or commonwealth, for which 
it is intended; it becomes a very complex subject, and of 
course requires great steadiness and comprehension of 
thought, as well as great knowledge of men and things, 
to do it properly. I shall, however, attempt it with my 
best abilities, and hope from the candor of the public to 
escape censure, if I cannot merit praise. 

I begin with my first and great principle, viz. : That the 
Constitution must vest powers in every department suffi- 
cient to secure and make effectual the ends of it. The 
supreme authority must have the power of making war 
and peace — of appointing armies and navies — of appointing 
officers both civil and military — of making contracts — 
of emitting, coining, and borrowing money — of regulating 
trade — of making treaties with foreign powers — of estab- 
lishing postoffices — and in short of doing everv^thing which 
the well-being of the Commonwealth may require, and 
which is not compatible to any particular State, all of 
which require money, and cannot possibly be made effectual 
without it. 

They must therefore of necessity be vested with a power 



23 

of taxation. I know this is a most important and weighty 
truth, a dreadful engine of oppression, tyranny, and injury, 
when ill used; yet, from the necessity of the case, it must 
be admitted. 

For to give a supreme authority a power of making 
contracts, without any power of payment — of appointing 
officers civil and military, without money to pay them — 
a power to build ships, without any money to do it with — 
a power of emitting money, without any power to redeem 
it — or of borrowing money, without any power to make 
payment, etc., etc. — such solecisms in government are so 
nugatory and absurd, that I really think to offer further 
argument on the subject, would be to insult the under- 
standing of my readers. 

To make all these payments dependent on the votes 
of thirteen popular assemblies, who will undertake to judge 
of the propriety of every contract and every occasion of 
money, and grant or withhold supplies, according to their 
opinion, whilst at the same time the operations of the whole 
may be stopped by the vote of a single one of them, is 
absurd ; for this renders all supplies so precarious and the 
public credit so extremely uncertain, as m.ust in its nature 
render all efforts in war, and all regular administration 
in peace, utterly impractical, as well as most pointedly 
ridiculous. Is there a man to be found, who would lend 
money, or render personal services, or make contracts on 
such precarious security? Of this we have a proof of fact, 
the strongest of all proofs, a fatal experience, the surest 
tho' severest of all demonstration, which renders all other 
proof or argument on this subject quite unnecessary. 

The present broken state of our finances — public debts 
and bankruptcies — enormous and ridiculous depreciation 
of public securities — with the total annihilation of our 
public credit — prove beyond all contradiction the vanity 
of all recourse to the federal Assemblies of the States. The 
recent instance of the duty of 5 per cent, on imported goods, 
struck dead, and the bankruptcies which ensued on the 
single vote of Rhode Island, affords another proof of what 
it is certain may be done again in like circumstances. 

I have another reason why a power of taxation or of 
raising money, ought to be vested in the supreme authority 
of our commonwealth, viz., the monies necessary for the 
public ought to be raised by a duty imposed on imported 
goods , not a bare 5 per cent, or any other per cent, on all 
imported goods indiscriminately, but a duty much heavier 



24 

on all articles of luxury or mere ornament, and which are 
consumed principally by the rich or prodigal part of the 
community, such as silks of all sorts, muslins, cambricks, 
lawns, superfine cloths, spirits, wines, etc., etc. 

Such an impost would ease the husbandman, the mechanic, 
and the poor; would have all the practical effects of a 
sumptuary law; would mend the economy, and increase 
the industry, of the community; would be collected without 
the shocking circumstances of collectors and their warrants ; 
and make the quantity of tax paid, always depend on the 
choice of the person who pays it. 

This tax can be laid by the supreme authority much more 
conveniently than by the particular Assemblies, and would 
in no case be subject to their repeals or modifications; 
and of course the public credit would never be dependent 
on, or liable to bankruptcy by the humors of any particular 
Assembly. — In an Essay on Finance, which I design soon 
to offer to the public, this subject will be treated more 
fully. (See my Sixth Essay on Free Trade and Finance, 
p. 229.) 

The delegates which are to form that august body, which 
are to hold and exercise the supreme authority, ought to be 
appointed by the States in any manner they please; in 
which they should not be limited by any restrictions; 
their own dignity and the weight they will hold in the great 
public councils, will always depend on the abilities of the 
persons they appoint to represent them there; and if they 
are wise enough to choose men of sufficient abilities, and 
respectable characters, men of sound sense, extensive 
knowledge, gravity, and integrity, they will reap the honor 
and advantage of such wisdom. 

But if they are fools enough to appoint men of trifling 
or vile characters, of mean abilities, faulty morals, or despic- 
able ignorance, they must reap the fruits of such folly, 
and content themselves to have no weight, dignity, or esteem 
in the public councils; and, what is more to be lamented 
by the Commonwealth, to do no good there. 

I have no objection to the States electing and recalling 
their delegates as often as they please, but think it hard 
and very injurious both to them and the Commonwealth, 
that they should be obliged to discontinue them after 
three years' service, if they find them on that trial to be 
men of sufficient integrity and abilities; a man of that 
experience is certainly much more" qualified to serve in the 
place, than a new member of equal good character can be; 



25 

experience makes perfect in every kind of business — old, 
experienced statesmen, of tried and approved integrity 
and abilities, are a great blessing to a State — they acquire 
great authority and esteem as well as wisdom, and very 
much contribute to keep the system of government in good 
and salutary order ; and this furnishes the strongest reason 
why they should be continued in the service, on Plato's 
great maxim, that "the man best qualified to serve, ought 
to be appointed." 

I am sorry to see a contrary maxim adopted in our Ameri- 
can counsels ; to make the highest reason that can be given 
for continuing a man in the public administration, assigned 
as a constitutional and absolute reason for turning him out, 
seems to me to be a solecism of a piece with m.any other 
reforms, by which we set out to surprise the world with 
our wisdom. 

If we should adopt this maxim in the common affairs 
of life, it would be found inconvenient, e. g., if we should 
make it a part of our Constitution, that a man who has 
served a three years' apprenticeship to the trade of a tailor 
or shoemaker, should be obliged to discontinue that business 
for the three successive years, I am of opinion the country 
would soon be cleared of good shoemakers and tailors. — 
Men are no more born statesmen than shoemakers or tailors 
— Experience is equally necessary to perfection in both. 

It seems to me that a man 's inducement to qualify him- 
self for a public employment, and make himself master of it, 
must be much discouraged by this consideration, that let 
him take whatever pains to qualify himself in the best 
manner, he must be shortly turned out, and of course it 
would be of more consequence to him, to turn his attention 
to some other business, which he might adopt when his 
present appointment should expire; and by this means 
the Commonwealth is in danger of losing the zeal, industry, 
and shining abilities, as well as services, of their most accom- 
plished and valuable men. 

I hear that the State of Georgia has im.proved on this 
blessed principle, and limited the continuance of their 
governors to one year; the consequence is, they have already 
the ghosts of departed governors stalking about in every 
part of their State, and growing more plenty every year; 
and as the price of everything is reduced by its plenty, I 
can suppose governors will soon be very low there. 

This doctrine of rotation was first proposed by some 
sprightly geniuses of brilliant politics, with this cogent 



26 

reason; that by introducing a rotation in the public offices, 
we should have a great number of men trained up to public 
service ; but it appears to me that it will be more likely to 
produce many jacks at all trades, but good at none. 

I think that frequent elections are a sufficient security 
against the continuance of men in public office whose con- 
duct is not approved, and there can be no reason for exclud- 
ing those whose conduct is approved, and who are allowed 
to be better qualified than any men who can be found to 
supply their places. 

Another great object of government, is the apportionment 
of burdens and benefits; for if a greater quota of burden, 
or a less quota of benefits than is just and right, be allotted 
to any State, this ill apportionment will be an everlasting 
source of uneasiness and discontent. In the first case, 
the overburdened State will complain; in the last case, all 
the States, whose quota of benefit is under-rated, will be 
uneasy; and this is a case of such delicacy, that it cannot 
be safely trusted to the arbitrary opinion or judgment 
of any body of men however august. 

Some natural principles of confessed equity, and which 
can be reduced to a certainty, ought, if possible, to be found 
and adopted ; for it is of the highest moment to the Common- 
wealth, to obviate, and, if possible, wholly to take away, 
such a fruitful and common source of infinite disputes, 
as that of apportionment of quotas has ever proved in all 
States of the earth. 

The value of lands may be a good rule; but the ascer- 
tainment of that value is impracticable; no assessment can 
be made which will not be liable to exception and debate — 
to adopt a good rule in anything which is impracticable, 
is absurd; for it is physically impossible that anything 
should be good for practise, which cannot be practised at 
all; but if the value of lands was capable of certain assess- 
ment, yet to adopt that value as a rule of apportionment 
of quotas, and at the same time to except from valuation 
large tracts of sundry States of immense value, which have 
all been defended by the joint arms of the whole iEmpire, 
and for the defence of which no additional quota of supply 
is to be demanded of those States, to whom such lands 
are secured by such joint efforts of the States, is in its nature 
unreasonable, and will open a door for great complaint. 

It is plain without argument, that such States ought 
either to make grants to the Commonwealth of such tracts 
of defended territory, or sell as much of them as will pay 



27 

their proper quota of defence, and pay such sums into the 
public treasury; and this ought to be done, let what rule 
of quota forever be adopted with respect to the cultivated 
part of the United States; for no proposition of natural 
right and justice can be plainer than this, that every part 
of valuable property which is defended, ought to contribute 
its quota of supply for that defence. 

If then the value of cultivated lands is found to be an 
impracticable rule of apportionment of quotas, we have to 
seek for som.e other, equally just and less exceptionable. 
It appears to me, that the number of living souls or 
human persons of whatever age, sex, or condition, will 
afford us a rule or measure of apportionment which wi:l 
forever increase and decrease with the real wealth of the 
States, and will of course be a perpetual rule, not capable 
of corruption by any circumstances of future time; which 
is of vast consideration in forming a constitution which is 
designed for perpetual di^ration, and which will in its nature 
be as just as to the inhabited parts of each State, as that 
of the value of lands, or any other that has or can be men- 
tioned. 

Land takes its value not merely from the goodness of 
its soil, but from innumerable other relative advantages 
among which the population of the country miay be con- 
sidered as principal; as lands in a full settled country will 
always (caeteris paribus) bring more than lands in thin 
settlements. On this principle, when the inhabitants of 
Russia, Poland, etc., sell real estates, they do not value 
them as we do, by the number of acres, but by the number 
of people who live on them. 

Where any piece of land has many advantages, many 
people will crowd there to obtain them; which will create 
many competitors for the purchase of it; which will of 
course raise the price. Where there are fewer advantages, 
there will be fevv^er competitors, and of course a less price; 
and these two things will forever be proportionate to each 
other, and of course the one will always be a sure index of 
the other. 

The only considerable objection I have ever heard to 
this, is, that the quality of inhabitants differs in the different 
States, and it is not reasonable that the black slaves in the 
southern States should be estimated on a par with the 
white freemen in the northern States. To discuss this 
question fairly, I think it will be just to estimate the neat 
value of the labor of both; and if it shall appear that the 



28 

labor of the black person produces as much neat wealth 
to the southern State, as the labor of the white person does 
to the northern State, I think it will follow plainly that they 
are equally useful inhabitants in point of wealth ; and there- 
fore in the case before us, should be estimated alike. 

And if the amazing profits which the southern planters 
boast of receiving from the labor of their slaves on their 
plantations, are real, the southern people have greatly the 
advantage in this kind of estim.ation, and as this objection 
comes principally from the southward, I should suppose 
that the gentlemen from that part would blush to urge it 
any farther. 

That the supreme authority should be vested with powers 
to terminate and finally decide controversies arising be- 
tween different States, I take it, will be universally admitted, 
but I humbly apprehend that an appeal from the first 
instance of trial ought to be admitted in causes of great 
moment, on the same reasons that such appeals are admitted 
in all the States of Europe. It is well known to all men 
versed in courts, that the first hearing of a cause rather 
gives an opening to that evidence and reason which ought 
to decide it, than such a full examination and thorough 
discussion, as should always precede a final judgment, in 
causes of national consequence. A detail of reasons might 
be added, which I deem it unnecessary to enlarge on here. 

The supreme authority ought to have a power of peace 
and war, and forming treaties and alliances with all foreign 
powers ; which implies a necessity of their also having suffi- 
cient powers to enforce the obedience of all subjects of the 
United States to such treaties and alliances; with full 
powers to unite the force of the States ; and direct its opera- 
tions in war; and to punish all transgressors in all these 
respects; otherwise, by the imprudence of a few, the whole 
Commonwealth may be embroiled with foreign powers, 
and the operations of war may be rendered useless, or fail 
much of their due eft"ect. 

All these I conceive will be easily granted, especially the 
latter, as the power of Congress to appoint and direct the 
arm.y and navy in war, with all departments thereto belong- 
ing, and punishing delinquents in them all, is already 
admitted into practise in the course of the present unhappy 
war, in which we have been long engaged. 

II. But now the great and most difficult part of this 
weighty subject remains to be considered, viz., how these 
supreme powers are to be constituted in such manner that 



29 

they may be able to exercise with full force and effect, the 
vast authorities committed to them, for the good and well- 
being of the United States, and yet be so checked and re- 
strained from exercising them to the injury and ruin of the 
States, that we may with safety trust them with a commis- 
sion of such vast magnitude — and may Almighty wisdom 
direct my pen in this arduous discussion. 

I. The men who compose this important council, must 
be delegated from all the States; and, of course, the hope 
of approbation and continuance of honors, will naturally 
stimulate them to act right, and to please; the dread of 
censure and disgrace will naturally operate as a check to 
restrain them from improper behavior : but however natural 
and forcible these motives may be, we find by sad experience, 
they are not always strong enough to produce the effects 
we expect and wish from them. 

It is to be wished that none might be appointed that 
were not fit and adequate to this weighty business; but a 
little knowledge of human nature, and a little acquaintance 
with the political history of mankind, will soon teach us 
that this is not to be expected. 

The representatives appointed by popular elections are 
commonly not only the legal, but real, substantial repre- 
sentatives of their electors, i. e., there will commonly be 
about the same proportion of grave, sound, well-qualified 
men, trifling, desultory men — wild or knavish schemers, 
— and dull, ignorant fools, in the delegated assembly, as 
in the body of electors. 

I know of no way to help this; such delegates must be 
admitted, as the States are pleased to send; and all that can 
be done is, when they get together, to make the best of them. 

We will suppose then they are all met in Congress, clothed 
with that vast authority which is necessary to the well- 
being, and even existence, of the union, that they should be 
vested with ; how shall we empower them to do all necessary 
and effectual good, and restrain them from doing hurt? 
To do this properly, I think we must recur to those natural 
motives of action, those feelings and apprehensions, which 
usually occur to the mind at the very time of action; for 
distant consequences, however weighty, are often too much 
disregarded. 

Truth loves light, and is vindicated by it. Wrong shrouds 
itself in darkness, and is supported by delusion. An honest 
well-qualified man loves light, can bear close examination, 
and critical inquiry, and is best pleased when he is most 



30 

thoroughly understood : a man of corrupt design, or a fool 
of no design, hates close examination and critical inquiry; 
the knavcr\' of the one, and the ignorance of the other, are 
discovered by it, and they both usually grow uneasy, before 
the investigation is half done. I do not believe that there 
is a more natural truth in the world, than that divine one 
of our Saviour, "he that doth truth, cometh to the light." 
I would therefore recommend that mode of deliberation, 
which will naturally bring on the most thorough and critical 
discussion of the subject, previous to passing any act; and 
for that purpose humbly propose, 

2. That the Congress shall consist of two chambers, 
an upper and a lower house, or senate and commons, with 
the concurrence of both necessarv' to everv' act; and that 
every State send one or more delegates to each house: this 
will subject ever\' act to two discussions before two dis- 
tinct chambers of men equally qualified for the debate, 
equally masters of the subject, and of equal authority in 
the decision. 

These two houses will be governed by the same natural 
motives and interests, viz., the good of the Commonwealth, 
and the approbation of the people. Whilst at the same 
time, the emulation naturally arising between them, will 
induce a very critical and sharp-sighted inspection into the 
motions of each other. Their different opinions will bring 
on conferences between the two houses, in which the whole 
subject will be exhausted in arguments pro and con, and 
shame will be the portion of obstinate convicted error. 

Under these circumstances, a man of ignorance or evil 
design will be afraid to impose on the creduHty, inattention, 
or confidence of his house, by introducing any corrupt or 
undigested proposition, which he knows he must be called 
on to defend against the severe scrutiny and poignant 
objections of the other house. I do not believe the many 
hurtful and foolish legislative acts which first or last have 
injured all the States on earth, have originated so much in 
corruption as indolence, ignorance, and a want of a full 
comprehension of the subject, which a full, prying and 
emulous discussion would tend in a great measure to remove: 
this naturally rouses the lazy and idle, who hate the pain 
of close thinking ; animates the ambitious to excel in policy 
and argument ; and excites the whole to support the dignity 
of their house, and vindicate their o\\-n propositions. 

I am not of opinion that bodies of elective men , which 
usually compose Parliaments, Diets, Assemblies, Congresses, 



31 

etc., are commonly dishonest : but I believe it rarely happens 
that there are not designing men among them; and I 
think it would be much more difficult for them to unite 
their partisans in two houses, and corrupt or deceive them 
both, than to carry on their designs where there is but one 
unalarmed, unapprehensive house to be managed; and as 
there is no hope of making these bad men good, the best 
policy is to embarrass them, and make their work as diffi- 
cult as possible. 

In these assemblies are frequently to be found sanguine 
men, upright enough indeed, but of strong, wild projection, 
whose brains are always teem.ing with Utopian, chimerical 
plans, and political whims, very destructive to society. I 
hardly know a greater evil than to have the supreme council 
of a Nation played off on such men's wires, such baseless 
visions at best end in darkness, and the dance, though easy 
and merry enough at first, rarely fails to plunge the cred- 
ulous, simple followers into sloughs and bogs at last. 

Nothing can tend more effectually to obviate these evils, 
and to mortify and cure such maggoty brains, than to see 
the absurdity of their projects exposed by the several argu- 
ments and keen satire which a full, emulous, and spirited 
discussion of the subject will naturally produce: we have 
had enough of these geniuses in the short course of our 
politics, both in our national and provincial councils, and 
have felt enough of their evil effects, to induce us to wish 
for any good method to keep ourselves clear of them in 
future. 

The consultations and decisions of national councils are 
so very important, that the fate of millions depends on them; 
therefore no man ought to speak in such assemblies, without 
considering that the fate of millions hangs on his tongue, 
— and of course a man can have no right in such august 
councils to utter undigested sentiments, or indulge himself 
in sudden, unexamined ffights of thought; his most tried 
and improved abilities are due to the State, who have 
trusted him with their most important interests. 

A man must therefore be most inexcusable, who is either 
absent during such debates, or sleeps, or whispers, or catches 
flies during the argument, and just rouses when the vote is 
called, to give his yea or nay, to the weal or woe of a nation. 
Therefore it is manifestly proper, that every natural motive 
that can operate on his understanding, or his passions, to 
engage his attention and utmost efforts, should be put in 
practise, and that his present feelings should be raised by 



32 

even' motive of honor and shame, to stimulate him to every 
practicable degree of diligence and exertion, to be as far 
as possible useful in the great discussion. 

I appeal to the feelings of every reader, if he would not 
(were he in either house) be much more strongly and naturally 
induced to exert his utmost abilities and attention to any 
question which was to pass through the ordeal of a spirited 
discussion of another house, than he would do, if the abso- 
lute decision depended on his own house, without any further 
inquiry or challenge on the subject. 

As Congress will ever be composed of men delegated by 
the several States, it may well be supposed that they have 
the confidence of their several States, and understand well 
the policy and present condition of them; it may also be 
supposed that they come with strong local attachments, 
and habits of thinking limited to the interests of their par- 
ticular States ; it may therefore be supposed they will need 
much information, in order to their gaining that enlarge- 
ment of ideas, and great comprehension of thought, which 
will be necessary to enable them to think properly on that 
large scale, which takes into view the interests of all the 
States. 

The greatest care and wisdom is therefore requisite to 
give them the best and surest information, and of that kind 
that may be the most safely relied on, to prevent their being 
deluded or prejudiced by partial representations, made by 
interested men who have particular views. 

This information may perhaps be best made by the great 
ministers of state, who ought to be men of the greatest 
abilities and integrity; their business is confined to their 
several departments, and their attention engaged strongly 
and constantly to all the several parts of the same; the 
whole arrangement, method, and order of which, are formed, 
superintended, and managed in their offices, and all infor- 
mations relative to their departments centre there. 

These ministers will of course have the best information, 
and most perfect knowledge, of the state of the Nation, as 
far as it relates to their several departments, and will of 
course be able to give the best information to Congress, in 
what manner any bill proposed will afi"ect the public interest 
in their several departments, which will nearly comprehend 
the whole. 

The Financier manages the whole subject of revenues 
and expenditures — the Sccretar\- of States takes knowledge 
of the general policy and internal government — the minister 



33 

of war presides in the whole business of war and defence — 
and the minister of foreign affairs regards the whole state of 
the nation, as it stands related to, or connected with, all 
foreign powers. 

I mention a Secretary of State, because all other nations 
have one, and I suppose we shall need one as much as they, 
and the multiplicity of affairs which naturally fall into his 
office will grow so fast, that I imagine we shall soon be under 
the necessity of appointing one. 

To these I would add Judges of Law, and chancery; but 
I fear they will not be very soon appointed — the one sup- 
poses the existence of law, the other of equit}^ — and when 
we shall be altogether convinced of the absolute necessity 
of the real and effectual existence of both these, we shall 
probably appoint proper heads to preside in those depart- 
ments. I would therefore propose, 

3. That when any bill shall pass the second reading in 
the house in which it originates, and before it shall be finally 
enacted, copies of it shall be sent to each of the said ministers 
of state, in being at the time, who shall give said house in 
writing, the fullest information in their power, and their 
most explicit sentiments of the operation of the said bill on 
the public interest, as far as relates to their respective 
departments, which shall be received and read in said house, 
and entered on their minutes, before they finally pass the 
bill; and when they send the bill for concurrence to the 
other house, they shall send therewith the said informations 
of the said ministers of state, which shall likewise be read 
in that house before their concurrence is finally passed. 

I do not mean to give these great ministers of state a 
negative on Congress, but I mean to oblige Congress to 
receive their advices before they pass their bills, and that 
every act shall be void that is not passed with these forms ; 
and I further propose, that either house of Congress may, 
if they please, admit the said ministers to be present and 
assist in the debates of the house, but without any right of 
vote in the decision. 

It appears to me, that if every act shall pass so many 
different corps of discussion before it is completed, where 
each of them stake their characters on the advice or vote 
they give, there will be all the light thrown on the case, 
which the nature and circumstances of it can admit, and 
any corrupt man will find it extremely difficult to foist in 
any erroneous clause whatever; and every ignorant or lazy 
man will find the strongest inducements to make himself 



34 

master of the subject, that he may appear with some toler- 
able degree of character in it ; and the whole will find them- 
selves in a manner compelled, diligently and sincerely to 
seek for the real state of the facts, and the natural fitness 
and truth arising from them, i. e., the whole natural prin- 
ciples on which the subjects depend, and which alone can 
endure every test, to the end that they may have not only 
the inward satisfaction of acting properly and usefully for 
the States, but also the credit and character which is or 
ought ever to be annexed to such a conduct. 

This will give the great laws of Congress the highest prob- 
ability, presumption, and means of right, fitness, and truth, 
that any laws whatever can have at their first enaction 
and will of course afford the highest reason for the confidence 
and acquiescence of the States, and all their subjects, in 
them; and being grounded in truth and natural fitness, 
their operations will be easy, salutary, and satisfactory. 

If experience shall discover error in any law (for practise 
will certainly discover such errors, if there be any) the 
legislature will always be able to correct them, by such 
repeals, amendmxcnts, or new laws as shall be found neces- 
sary ; but as it is much easier to prevent mischiefs than to 
remedy them, all possible caution, prudence, and attention 
should be sued, to make the laws right at first. 

4. There is another body of men among us, whose busi- 
ness of life, and whose full and extensive intelligence, for- 
eign and domestic, naturally make them more perfectly 
acquainted with the sources of our wealth, and whose 
particular interests are more intimately and necessarily 
connected with the general prosperity of the country, than 
any other order of men in the States. I mean the Merchants ; 
and I could wish that Congress might have .the benefit of 
that extensive and important information, which this body 
of men are very capable of laying before them. 

Trade is of such essential importance to our interests, 
and so intimately connected with all our staples, great and 
small, that no sources of our wealth can flourish, and operate 
to the general benefit of the community, without it. Our 
husbandry, that great staple of our country, can never 
exceed our home consumption without this — it is plain at 
first sight, that the farmer will not toil and sweat through 
the year to raise great plenty of the produce of the soil, if 
there is no market for his produce, when he has it ready 
for sale, i. e., if there are no merchants to buy it. 

In like manner, the manufacturer will not lay out his 



35 

business on any large scale, if there is no merchant to buy 
his fabrics when he has finished them ; a vent is of the most 
essential importance to every manufacturing country — 
the merchants, therefore, become the natural negotiators of 
the wealth of the country, who take off the abundance, and 
supply the wants, of the inhabitants; — and as this negotia- 
tion is the business of their lives, and the source of their 
own wealth, they of course become better acquainted with 
both our abundance and wants, and are more interested 
in finding and improving the best vent for the one, and 
supply of the other, than any other men among us, and they 
have a natural interest in making both the purchase and 
supply as convenient to their customers as possible, that 
they may secure their custom, and thereby increase their 
own business. 

It follows then, that the m^erchants are not only qualified 
to give the fullest and most important information to our 
supreme legislature, concerning the state of our trade — 
the abundance and wants — the wealth and poverty, of our 
people, i. e., their most important interests, but are also the 
most likely to do it fairly and truly, and to forward with their 
influence, every measure which will operate to the conveni- 
ence and benefit of our commerce, and oppose with their 
whole weight and superior knowledge of the subject, any 
wild schemes, which an ignorant or arbitrary legislature 
may attempt to introduce, to the hurt and embarrasment 
of our intercourse both with one another, and with foreigners. 

The States of Venice and Holland have ever been governed 
by merchants, or at least their policy has ever been under 
the great influence of that sort of men. No States have 
been better served, as appears by their great success, the 
ease and happiness of their citizens, as well as the strength 
and riches of their Commonwealths: the one is the oldest, 
and the other the richest. State in the world of equal num.ber 
of people — the one has maintained sundry wars with the 
Grand Turk — the other has withstood the power of Spain 
and France; and the capitals of both have long been the 
principal marts of the several parts of Europe in which they 
are situated; and the banks of both are the best supported, 
and in the best credit, of any banks in Europe, though their 
countries or territories are very small, and their inhabitants 
but a handful, when compared with the great States in their 
neighbourhood. 

Merchants must, from nature of the their business, cer- 
tainly understand the interests and resources of their 



36 

country, the best of any men in it ; and I know not of any 
one reason why they should be deemed less upright or 
patriotic, than any other rank of citizen whatever. 

I therefore humbly propose, if the merchants in the 
several States are disposed to send delegates from their 
body, to meet and attend the sitting of Congress, that they 
shall be permitted to form a chamber of commerce, and 
their advice to Congress be demanded and admitted con- 
cerning all bills before Congress, as far as the same may 
affect the trade of the States. 

I have no idea that the continent is made for Congress: 
I take them to be no more than the upper servants of the 
great political body, who are to find out things by study and 
inquiry as other people do ; and therefore I think it necessary 
to place them under the best possible advantages for infor- 
mation, and to require them to improve all those advan- 
tages, to qualify themselves in the best manner possible, 
for the wise and useful discharge of the vast trust and mighty 
authority reposed in them ; and as I conceive the advice of 
the merchants to be one of the greatest sources of mercantile 
information, which is anywhere placed within their reach, 
it ought by no means to be neglected, but so husbanded 
and improved, that the greatest possible advantages may 
be derived from it. 

Besides this, I have another reason why the merchants 
ought to be consulted; I take it to be very plain that the 
husbantry and manufactures of the country must be ruined, 
if the present rate of taxes is continued on them much longer, 
and of course a very great part of our revenue must arise 
from imposts on merchandise, which will fall directly within 
the merchants' sphere of business, and of course their con- 
currence and advice will be of the utmost consequence, not 
only to direct the properest mode of le\Ting those duties, 
but also to get them carried into quiet and peaceable exe- 
cution. 

No men are more conversant with the citizens, or more 
intimately connected with their interests, than the mer- 
chants, and therefore their weight and influence will have a 
mighty effect on the minds of the people. I do not recollect 
an instance, in which the Court of London ever rejected the 
remonstrances and advices of the merchants, and did not 
suffer severely for their pride. We have some striking 
instances of this in the disregarded advices and remon- 
strances of ver>'' many English merchants against the Ameri- 
can war, and their fears and apprehensions we see verified, 
almost like prophecies by the event, .^j . 



3t 

I know not why I should continue this argument any 
longer or -indeed why I should have urged it so long, in as 
much as I cannot conceive that Congress or anybody else 
will deem it below the dignity of the supreme power to con- 
sult so important an order of men, in matters of the first 
consequence, which fall immediately under their notice, 
and in vv^hich their experience, and of course their knowledge 
and advice, are preferable to those of any other order of men. 

Besides the benefits which Congress may receive from 
this institution, a chamber of commerce, composed of mem- 
bers from all trading towns in the States, if properly insti- 
tuted and conducted, will produce very many, I might almost 
say, innumerable advantages of singular utility to all the 
States — it will give dignity, uniformity, and safety to our 
trade — establish the credit of the bank — secure the con- 
fidence of foreign merchants — prove in very many instances 
a fruitful source of improvement of our staples and mutual 
intercourse — correct many abuses — pacify discontents — 
unite us in our interests, and thereby cement the general 
union of the whole Commonwealth — will relieve Congress 
from the pain and trouble of deciding many intricate ques- 
tions of trade which they do not understand, by referring 
them over to this chamber, where they will be discussed by 
an order of men, the most competent to the business of any 
that can be found, and most likely to give a decision that 
shall be just, useful, and satisfactory. 

It may be objected to all this, that the less complex and 
the more simple every constitution is, the nearer it comes 
to perfection: this argument would be very good, and 
afford a very forcible conclusion, if the government of men 
was like that of the Almighty, always founded on wisdom, 
knowledge and truth; but in the present imperfect state of 
human nature, where the best of men know but in part, 
and must recur to advice and information for the rest, it 
certainly becomes necessary to form a constitution on such 
principles, as will secure that information and advice in 
the best and surest m^anner possible. 

It may be further objected that the forms herein proposed 
will embarrass the business of Congress, and make it at 
best slov/ and dilatory. As far as this form will prevent the 
hurrying a bill through the house without due examination, 
the objection itself becomes an advantage — at most these 
checks on the supreme authority can have no further effect 
than to delay or destroy a good bill, but cannot pass a bad 
one; and I think it much better in the main, to lose a good 



38 

bill than to suffer a bad one to pass into a law. — Besides it 
is not to be supposed that clear, plain cases will meet with 
embarrassment, and it is most safe that untried, doubtful, 
difficult matters should pass through the gravest and fullest 
discussion, before the sanction of the law is given to them. 

But what is to be done if the two houses grow jealous 
and ill-natured, and after all their information and advice, 
grow out of humor and insincere, and no concurrence can be 
obtained? I answer, sit still and do nothing until they get 
into a better humor : I think this is much better than to pass 
laws in such a temper and spirit, as the objection supposes. 

It is however an ill compliment to so many grave person- 
ages, to suppose them capable of throwing aside their 
reason, and giving themselves up like children to the control 
of their passions; or, if this should happen for a moment, 
that it should continue any length of time, is hardly to be 
presumed of a body of men placed in such high stations of 
dignity and importance, with the eyes of all the world upon 
them — but if they should, after all, be capable of this, I 
think it madness to set them to making laws, during such 
fits — it is best, when they are in no condition to do good, 
to keep them from doing hurt — and if they do not grow 
wiser in reasonable time, I know of nothing better, than to be 
ashamed of our old appointments, and make new ones. 

But what if the country is invaded, or some other exigency 
happens, so pressing that the safety of the State requires 
an immediate resolution? I answer, what would you do 
if such a case should happen, where there was but one house, 
unchecked, but equally divided, so that a legal vote could 
not be obtained. The matter is certainly equally difficult 
and embarrassed in both cases: but in the case proposed 
I know of no better way than that which the Romans 
adopted on the like occasion, viz., that both houses meet 
in one chamber, and choose a dictator, who should have 
and exercise the whole power of both houses, till such time 
as they should be able to concur in displacing him , and that 
the whole power of the two houses should be suspended in 
the mean time. 

5. I further propose, that no grant of money whatever 
shall be made, without an appropriation, and that rigid 
penalties (no matter how great, in my opinion the halter 
would be mild enough) shall be inflicted on any person, 
however august his station, who should give order, or vote 
for the payment, or actually pay one shilling of such money 
to any other purpose than that of its appropriation, and 



39 

that no order whatever of any superior in office shall justify 
such payment, but every order shall express what funds 
it is drawn upon, and what appropriation it is to be charged 
to, or the order shall not be paid. 

This kind of embezzlement is of so fatal a nature, that 
no measures or bounds are to be observed in curing it; 
when ministers will set forth the most specious and necessary 
occasions for m.oney, and induce the people to pay it in 
full tale; and when they have gotten possession of it, 
to neglect the great objects for which it was given, and pay 
it, sometimes squander it away, for different purposes, 
oftentimes for useless, yea, hurtful ones, yea, often even to 
bribe and corrupt the very officers of government, to betray 
their trust, and contaminate the State, even in its public 
offices— to force people to buy their own destruction, and 
pay for it with their hard labor, the very sweat of their brow, 
is a crime of so high a nature, that I know not any gibbet 
too cruel for such offenders. 

6. I would further propose, that the aforesaid great 
ministers of state shall compose a Council of State, to whose 
number Congress may add three others, viz., one from New 
England, one from the middle States, and one from the 
southern States, one of which to be appointed President by 
Congress; to all of whom shall be committed the supreme 
executive authority of the States (all and singular of them 
ever accountable to Congress) who shall superintend all 
the executive departments, and appoint all executive 
officers, who shall ever be accountable to, and removable 
for just cause by, them or Congress, i. e., either of them. 

7. I propose further, that the powers of Congress, and all 
the other departments, acting under them, shall all be 
restricted to such matters only of general necessity and 
utility to all the States, as cannot come within the juris- 
diction of any particular State, or to which the authority 
of any particular State is not competent: so that each 
particular State shall enjoy all sovereignty and suprem^e 
authority to all intents and purposes, excepting only those 
high authorities and powers by them delegated to Congress, 
for the purposes of the general union. 

There remains one very important article still to be 
discussed, viz., what methods the Constitution shall point 
out, to enforce the acts and requisitions of Congress through 
the several States; and how the States which refuse or 
delay obedience to such acts and requitisions, shall be 
treated : this, I know, is a particular of the greatest delicacy, 



40 

as well as of the utmost importance; and therefore, I think, 
ought to be decidedly settled by the Constitution, in our 
coolest hours, whilst no passions or prejudices exist, which 
may be excited by the great interests or strong circumstances 
of any particular case which may happen. 

I know that supreme authorities are liable to err, as well 
as subordinate ones. I know that courts may be in the 
wrong, as well as the people; such is the imperfect state 
of human nature in all ranks and degrees of men; but we 
must take human nature as it is; it cannot be mended; 
and we are compelled both by wisdom and necessity, to 
adopt such methods as promise the greatest attainable good, 
though perhaps not the greatest possible, and such as are 
liable to the fewest inconveniences, though not altogether 
free of them. 

This is a question of such magnitude, that I think it 
necessary to premise the great natural principles on which 
its decision ought to depend — In the present state of human 
nature, all human life is a life of chances; it is impossible 
to make any interest so certain, but there will be a chance 
against it ; and we are in all cases obliged to adopt a chance 
against us, in order to bring ourselves within the benefit 
of a greater chance in our favor; and that calculation of 
chances which is grounded on the great natural principles 
of truth and fitness, is of all others the most likely to come 
out right. 

1. No laws of any State whatever, which do not carry in 
them a force which extends to their effectual and final 
execution, can afford a certain or sufficient security to the 
subject : this is too plain to need any proof. 

2. Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of august 
bodies of high dignity and consequence), which fail of 
execution are much worse than none; they weaken the 
government; expose it to contempt; destroy the confidence 
of all men, natives and foreigners, in it; and expose both 
aggregate bodies and individuals, who have placed confi- 
dence in it, to many ruinous disappointments, which they 
would have escaped, had no law or ordinance been made: 
therefore, 

3. To appoint a Congress with powers to do all acts 
necessary for the support and uses of the union; and 
at the same time to leave all the States at liberty to obey 
them or not with impunity, is, in every view, the grossest 
absurdity, worse than a state of nature without any supreme 
authority at all, and at best a ridiculous effort of childish 
nonsense: and of course, 



41 

4- Every State in the Union is under the highest obli- 
gation to obey the supreme authority of the whole, and 
in the highest degree amenable to it, and subject to the 
highest censure for disobedience — Yet all this notwith- 
standing, I think the soul that sins shall die, i. e., the censure 
of the great supreme power, ought to be so directed, if 
possible, as to light on those persons, who have betrayed 
their country, and exposed it to dissolution, by opposing 
and rejecting that supreme authority, which is the band 
of our union, and from whence proceeds the principal 
strength and energy of our government. 

I therefore propose, that every person whatever, whether 
in public or private character, who shall, by public vote 
or overt act, disobey the supreme authority, shall be amen- 
able to Congress, shall be summoned and compelled to appear 
before Congress, and, on due conviction, suffer such fine, 
imprisonment, or other punishment, as the supreme author- 
ity shall judge requisite. 

It may be objected here, that this will make a Member 
of Assembly accountable to Congress for his vote in Assem- 
bly; I an.swer, it does so in this only case, viz., when that 
vote is to disobey the supreme authority; no Member of 
Assembly can have right to give such a vote, and therefore 
ought to be punished for so doing — When the supreme 
authority is disobeyed, the government must lose its energy 
and effect, and of course the Empire must be shaken to its 
very foundation. 

A government which is but half executed, or whose 
operations may all be stopped by a single vote, is the most 
dangerous of all institutions. — See the present Poland, 
and ancient Greece buried in ruins, in consequence of this 
fatal error in their policy. A government which has not 
energy and effect, can never afford protection or security 
to its subjects, i. e., must ever be ineffectual to its own ends. 

I cannot therefore admit, that the great ends of our 
Union should lie at the mercy of a single State, or that the 
energy of our government should be checked by a single 
disobedience, or that such disobedience should ever be 
sheltered from censure and punishment; the consequences 
is too capital, too fatal to be admitted. Even though I 
know very well that a supreme authority, with all its dignity 
and importance, is subject to passions like other lesser 
powers, that they may be and often are heated, violent, 
oppressive, and very tyrannical; yet I know also, that 
perfection is not to be hoped for in this life, and we must 



42 

take all institutions with their natural defects, or reject 
them altogether : I will guard against these abuses of power 
as far as possible, but I cannot give up all government, or 
destroy its necessary energy, for fear of these abuses. 

But to fence them out as far as possible, and to give the 
States as great a check on the supreme authority, as can 
consist with its necessary energy and effect, 

I propose that any State may petition Congress to repeal 
any law or decision which they have made, and if more 
than half the States do this, the law or decision shall be 
repealed, let its nature or importance be however great, 
excepting only such acts as create funds for the public 
credit, which shall never be repealed till their end is effected, 
or other funds equally eft>ctual are substituted in their place ; 
but Congress shall not be obliged to repeal any of these acts, 
so petitioned against, till they have time to lay the reasons 
of such acts before such petitioning States, and to receive 
their answer ; because such petitions may arise from sudden 
heats, popular prejudices, or the publication of matters 
false in fact, and may require time and means of cool 
reflection and the fullest information, before the final deci- 
sion is made : but if after all more than half of the States 
persist m their demand of a repeal, it shall take place. 

The reason is, the uneasiness of a majority of States 
affords a strong presumption that the act is wrong, for 
uneasiness arises much more frequently from wrong than 
right; but if the act was good and right, it would still be 
better to repeal and lose it, than to force the execution of it 
against the opinion of a major part of the States; and 
lastly, if every act of Congress is subject to this repeal, 
Congress itself will have stronger inducement not only to 
examine well the several acts under their consideration, 
but also to communicate the reasons of them to the States, 
than they would have if their simple vote gave the final 
stamp of irrevocable authority to their acts. 

Further I propose, that if the execution of any act or 
order of the supreme authority shall be opposed by force 
in any of the States (which God forbid) it shall be lawful 
for Congress to send into such State a sufficient force to 
suppress it. 

On the whole, I take it that the very existence and use 
of our union essentially depends on the full energy and 
final effect of the laws m.ade to support it; and therefore 
I sacrifice all other considerations to this energy and efi'ect, 
and if our Union is not worth this purchase, we must give 



43 

it up — the nature of the thing does not admit of any other 
alternative. 

I do contend that our Union is worth this purchase— 
with it, every individual rests secure under its protection 
against foreign or domestic insult and oppression — without 
it, we can have no security against the oppression, insult, 
and invasion of foreign powers; for no single State is of 
importance enough to be an object of treaty with them, 
nor, if it was, could it bear the expense of such treaties, or 
support any character or respect in a dissevered state, 
but must lose all respectability among the nations abroad. 

We have a very extensive trade, which cannot be carried 
on with security and advantage, without treaties of com- 
merce and alliance with foreign nations. 

We have an extensive western territory which cannot 
otherwise be defended against the invasion of foreign nations, 
bordering on our frontiers, who will cover it with their own 
inhabitants, and we shall lose it forever, and our extent 
of empire be thereby restrained; and what is worse, their 
numerous posterity will in future time drive ours into the 
sea, as the Goths and Vandals formerly conquered the 
Romans in like circumstances, unless we have the force 
of the union to repel such invasions. We have, without 
the union, no security against the inroads and wars of one 
State upon another, by which our wealth and strength, 
as well as ease and comfort, will be devoured by enemies 
growing out of our own bowels. 

I conclude then, that our union is not only of the most 
essential consequence to the well-being of the States in 
general but to that of every individual citizen of them, and 
of course ought to be supported, and made as useful and 
safe as possible, by a Constitution which admits that full 
energy and final effect of government which alone can secure 
its great ends and uses. 

In a dissertation of this sort, I would not wish to descend 
to minutiae, yet there are some small matters which have 
important consequences, and therefore ought to be noticed. 
It is necessary that Congress should have all usual and 
necessary powers of self-preservation and order, e. g., to 
imprison for contempt, insult, or interruption, etc., and to 
expel their own members for due causes, among which 
I would rank that of non-attendance on the house, or 
partial attendance without such excuse as shall satisfy 
the house. 

Where there is such vast authority and trust devolved 
on Congress, and the grand and most important interests 



44 

of the Empire rest on their decisions, it appears to me 
highly unreasonable that we should suffer their august 
consultations to be suspended, or their dignity, authority, 
and influence lessened by the idleness, neglect, and non- 
attendance of its members; for we know that the acts of 
a thin house do not usually carry with them the same 
degree of weight and respect as those of a full house. 

Besides I think, when a man is deputed a delegate in 
Congress, and has undertaken the business, the whole 
Empire becomes of course possessed of a right to his best 
and constant services, which if any member refuses or 
neglects, the Empire is injured and ought to resent the 
injury, at least so far as to expel and send him home, that 
so his place may be better supplied. 

I have one argument in favor of my whole plan, viz., 
it is so formed that no men of dull intellects, or small knowl- 
edge, or of habits too idle for constant attendance, or close 
and steady attention, can do the business with any tolerable 
degree of respectability, nor can they find cither honor, 
profit, or satisfaction in being there, and of course, I could 
wish that the choice of the electors might never fall on such 
a man, or if it should, that he might have sense enough 
(of pain at least, if not of shame) to decline his acceptance. 

For after all that can be done, I do not think that a good 
administration depends wholly on a good Constitution and 
good laws, for insufficient or bad men will always make 
bad work, and a bad administration, let the Constitution 
and laws be ever so good; the management of able, faithful, 
and upright men alone can cause an administration to 
brighten, and the dignity and wisdom of an Empire to rise 
into respect; make truth the line and measure of public 
decision; give weight and authority to the government, 
and security and peace to the subject. 

We now hope that we are on the close of a war of mighty 
effort and great distress, against the greatest power on earth, 
whetted into the most keen resentment and savage fierce- 
ness, which can be excited by wounded pride, and which 
usually rises higher between brother and brother offended, 
than between strangers in contest. Twelve of the Thirteen 
United States have felt the actual and cruel invasions 
of the enemy, and eleven of our capitals have been under 
their power, first or last, during the dreadful conflict; but 
a good Providence, our own virtue and firmness, and the 
help of our friends, have enabled us to rise superior to all 
the power of our adversaries, and made them seek to be 
at peace with us. 



45 

During the extreme pressures of the war, indeed many 
errors in our administration have been committed, when 
we could not have experience and time for reflection, to 
make us wise; but these will easily be excused, forgiven, 
and forgotten, if we can now, while at leisure, find virtue, 
wisdom, and foresight enough to correct them, and form 
such establishments, as shall secure the great ends of our 
union, and give dignity, force, utility, and permanency 
to our Empire. 

It is a pity we should lose the honor and blessings which 
have cost us so dear, for want of wisdom and firmness 
in measures, which are essential to our preservation. It is 
now at our option, either to fall back into our original 
atoms, or form such an union, as shall command the respect 
of the world, and give honor and security to our people. 

This vast subject lies with mighty weight on my mind, 
and I have bestowed on it my utmost attention, and here 
offer the public the best thoughts and sentiments I am 
master of. I have confined myself in this dissertation 
entirely to the nature, reason, and truth of my subject, 
without once adverting to the reception it might meet 
with from men of different prejudices or interests. To 
find the truth, not to carry a point, has been my object. 

I have not the vanity to imagine that my sentiments 
may be adopted ; I shall have all the reward I wish or expect, 
if my dissertation shall throw any light on the great subject, 
shall excite an emulation of inquiry, and animate some 
abler genius to form a plan of greater perfection, less objec- 
tionable, and more useful. 



NOTES APPENDED BY PELATIAH WEBSTER TO THE RE- 
PUBLICATION MADE AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1791. 

NOTE 1. 

I . Forming a plan of confederation, or a system of general 
government of the United States, engrossed the attention 
of Congress from the declaration of independence, July 4, 
1776, till the same was completed by Congress, July 9, 1778, 
and recommended to the several States for ratification, 
which finally took place, March i, 1781; from which time 
the said confederation was considered as the grand consti- 
tution of the general government, and the whole adminis- 
tration was conformed to it. 

And as it had stood the test of discussion in Congress 



46 

for two years, before they completed and adopted it, and 
in all the States for three years more, before it was finally 
ratified, one would have thought that it must have been a 
very finished and perfect plan of government. 

But on trial of it in practice, it was found to be extremely 
weak, defective, totally inefficient, and altogether inade- 
quate to its great ends and purposes. For, 

1. It blended the legislative and executive powers 
together in one body. 

2. This body, viz., Congress, consisted of but one house, 
without any check upon their resolutions. 

3. The powers of Congress in xQry few instances were 
definitive and final ; in the most important articles of govern- 
ment they could do no more than recommend to the several 
States; the consent of every one of which was necessary 
to give legal sanction to any act so recommended. 

4. They could assess and le\^^ no taxes. 

5. They could institute and execute no punishments, 
except in the military- department. 

6. They had no power of deciding or controlling the 
contentions and disputes of different States with each 
other. 

7. They could not regulate the general trade: or, 

8. Even make laws to secure either public treaties with 
foreign States, or the persons of public ambassadors, or 
to punish violations or injuries done to either of them. 

9. They could institute no general judiciary' powers. 

10. They could regulate no public roads, canals, or inland 
navigation, etc., etc., etc. 

And what caps all the rest was, that (whilst under such an 
inefficient political constitution, the only chance we had of 
any tolerable administration lay wholly in the prudence 
and wisdom of the men who happened to take the lead in our 
public councils) it was fatally provided by the absurd doc- 
trine of rotation, that if any Member of Congress by three 
years' experience and application, had qualified himself 
to manage our public affairs with consistency and fitness, 
that he should be constitutionally and absolutely rendered 
incapable of serving any longer, till by three years' discon- 
tinuance, he had pretty well lost the cue or train of the 
public counsels, and forgot the ideas and plans which made 
his service useful and important; and, in the mean time, 
his place should be supplied by a fresh man, who had the 
whole matter to learn, and when he had learned it, was 
to give place to another fresh man; and so on to the end 
of the chapter. 



47 

The sensible mind of the United States, by long experience 
of the fatal mischiefs of anarchy, or (which is about the same 
thing) of this ridiculous, inefficient form of government, 
began to apprehend that there was something wrong in our 
policy, which ought to be redressed and mended; but 
nobody undertook to delineate the necessary amendments. 

I was then pretty much at leisure, and was fully of opinion 
(though the sentiment at that time would not very well 
bear) that it would be ten times easier to form a new consti- 
tution than to mend the old one. I therefore sat myself 
down to sketch out the leading principles of that political 
constitution, which I thought necessary to the preservation 
and happiness of the United States of America, which are 
comprised in this Dissertation. 

I hope the reader will please to consider, that these are 
the original thoughts of a private individual, dictated by 
the nature of the subject only, long before the important 
theme became the great object of discussion, in the most 
dignified and important assembly, which ever sat or decided 
in America. 

NOTE 2. 

At the time when this Dissertation was written (Feb.i6, 
1783) the defects and insufficiency of the Old Federal 
Constitution were universally felt and acknowledged ; it was 
manifest, not only that the internal police, justice, security 
and peace of the States could never be preserved under it, 
but the finances and public credit would necessarily become 
so embarrassed, precarious, and void of support, that no 
public movement, which depended on the revenue, could 
be managed with any effectual certainty : but though the 
public mind was under full conviction of all these mischiefs, 
and was contemplating a remedy, yet the public ideas were 
not at all concentrated, much less arranged into any new 
system or form of government, which would obviate these 
evils. Under these circumstances I offered this Dissertation 
to the public : how far the principles of it were adopted or 
rejected in the New Constitution, which was four years 
afterwards (Sept. 17, 1787) formed by the General Conven- 
tion, and since ratified by all the States, is obvious to 

every one. . , r , 

I wish here to remark the great particulars of my plan 

which were rejected by the Convention. 

I. My plan was to keep the legislative and executive 

departments entirely distinct; the one to consist of the two 



48 

houses of Congress, the other to rest entirely in the Grand 
Council of State. 

2. I proposed to introduce a Chamber of Commerce, to 
consist of merchants, who should be consulted by the 
legislature in all matters of trade and revenue, and which 
should have the conducting the revenue committed to them. 

The first of these the Convention qualified; the second 
they say nothing of, i. e., take no notice of it. 

3. I proposed that the great officers of state should have 
the perusal of all bills, before they were enacted into laws, 
and should be required to give their opinion of them, as far 
as they affected the public interest in their several depart- 
ments; which report of them Congress should cause to be 
read in their respective houses, and entered on their minutes. 
This is passed over without notice. 

4. I proposed that all public officers appointed by the 
executive authority, should be amenable both to them and 
to the legislative power, and removable for just cause by 
either of them. This is qualified by the Convention. 

And in as much as my sentiments in these respects were 
either qualified or totally neglected by the Convention, 
I suppose they were wrong; however, the whole matter 
is submitted to the politicians of the present age, and to 
our posterity in future. 

In sundry other things, the Convention have gone into 
minutiae, e. g., respecting elections of President, Senators, 
and Representatives in Congress, etc., which I proposed 
to leave at large to the wisdom and discretion of Congress, 
and of the several States. 

Great reasons may doubtless be assigned for their decision, 
and perhaps some little ones for mine. Time, the great 
arbiter of all human plans, may, after a while, give his 
decision; but neither the Convention nor myself will prob- 
ably live to feel either the exultation or mortification of his 
approbation or disapprobation of either of our plans. 

But if any of these questions should in future time become 
objects of discussion, neither the vast dignity of the Conven- 
tion, nor the low, unnoticed state of myself, will be at all 
considered in the debates ; the merits of the matter, and the 
interests connected with or arising out of it, will alone 
dictate the decision. 

Humbly presented by 

HANNIS TAYLOR. 



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